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Abstract
Introduction: Incidents involving the exposure of large numbers of people to radiological
material can have serious consequences for those affected, their community and wider
society. In many instances, the psychological effects of these incidents have the greatest
impact. People fear radiation and even incidents which result in little or no actual
exposure have the potential to cause widespread anxiety and behavior change. The aim
of this study was to assess public intentions, beliefs and information needs in the UK
and Germany in response to a hidden radiological exposure device. By assessing how the
public is likely to react to such events, strategies for more effective crisis and risk
communication can be developed and designed to address any knowledge gaps,
misperceptions and behavioral responses that are contrary to public health advice.
Methods: This study had three stages. The ﬁrst stage consisted of focus groups which
identiﬁed perceptions of and reactions to a covert radiological device. The incident was
introduced to participants using a series of mock newspaper and broadcast injects to
convey the evolving scenario. The outcomes of these focus groups were used to inform
national telephone surveys, which quantiﬁed intended behaviors and assessed what per-
ceptions were correlated with these behaviors. Focus group and survey results were used to
develop video and leaﬂet communication interventions, which were then evaluated in a
second round of focus groups.
Results: In the ﬁrst two stages, misperceptions about the likelihood and routes of
exposure were associated with higher levels of worry and greater likelihood of engaging in
behaviors that might be detrimental to ongoing public health efforts. The ﬁnal focus
groups demonstrated that both types of misunderstanding are amenable to change fol-
lowing targeted communication.
Conclusion: Should terrorists succeed in placing a hidden radiological device in a
public location, then health agencies may ﬁnd that it is easier to communicate effectively
with the public if they explicitly and clearly discuss the mechanisms through which
someone could be affected by the radiation and the known geographical spread of
any risk. Messages which explain how the risk from a hidden radiological device
‘‘works’’ should be prepared and tested in advance so that they can be rapidly deployed if
the need arises.
Pearce JM, Rubin GJ, Selke P, Amloˆt R, Mowbray F, Rogers MB. Communicating
with the public following radiological terrorism: results from a series of focus groups
and national surveys in Britain and Germany. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2013;28(2):1-10.
Introduction
Incidents involving the exposure of large numbers of people to radiological material can
have serious consequences for those affected, their community and wider society. In many
instances, the psychological effects of these incidents have the greatest impact. People fear
radiation;1 lack of visiblity and the delay between exposure and negative health impacts
lead to uncertainty and concern,2,3 and even incidents which result in little or no actual
exposure have the potential to cause widespread anxiety and behavior change.2
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It is understandable, then, that terrorist groups are interested
in acquiring radiological weapons,4 and it is vital that ofﬁcial
agencies can successfully communicate with the public about the
risks involved and protective actions required if a terrorist event
involving radiological materials were to occur.5-7 Evidence from
non-malicious events such as the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear
accident,5 the 1987 Goiania radiation accident,8 and the 2011
Fukushima nuclear accident9 demonstrate the importance of
reducing uncertainty and enhancing information credibility to
mitigate the psychological impact of radiological incidents.
Survey studies of anticipated public responses to radiological
terrorism further support the need for credible information to
offset likely confusion and uncertainty which may result in high
demands on medical services.10,11
Previous studies that have focused on communicating with
the public following Chemical, Biological, Radiological or
Nuclear (CBRN) terrorist events,5,12-27 have suggested that
CBRN terrorism can lead to anxiety and fatalism, which is likely
to negatively impact on the lay public’s ability to understand
information given after an incident.28 Furthermore, members of
the public tend to exhibit low levels of knowledge about CBRN
agents and often hold inaccurate beliefs about these substances,
which can make communicating about these types of incident
particularly challenging.29-32
Studies that have focused on how people might speciﬁcally
respond to a radiological attack have typically used a scenario
which involves an improvised radiological dispersion device
(RDD) or ‘‘dirty bomb’’.4 This consists of a radioactive source
combined with explosive material to produce a conventional
explosion which spreads radioactive material. The attention paid
to this particular scenario is unsurprising, as a number of
intended radiological terror attacks which have been prevented in
recent years involved attempts to use dirty bombs.4 Nevertheless,
it is important to also consider other malevolent uses for
radiological materials which are equally plausible, particularly the
covert use of radiation.4 The lack of familiary and heightened
uncertainty associated with this type of attack might predict
increased anxiety and fatalism. However, the muted public
response to the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko with radio-
active polonium-210 in London shows that one cannot assume
this to be the case.33 A radiological exposure device (RED) is one
way in which radiological material could be used for a covert
terrorist attack. An RED is a source of radiation that has been
deliberately hidden with a view to exposing people in the
immediate area to signiﬁcant doses of ionizing radiation without
their knowledge. Unlike RDDs, these devices do not incorporate
any explosive material or result in any long-lasting contamina-
tion. Once an RED has been found and removed, it no longer
presents a risk to the public.
In this study, a hypothetical RED scenario was used to assess
perceptions of, and possible reactions to, a covert radiological
attack. The research had three stages. The ﬁrst stage consisted of
focus groups with members of the public to identify their
information needs and behavioral intentions in response to the
scenario. The outcomes of these focus groups were used to inform
national telephone surveys, which quantiﬁed intended behaviors
and assessed what perceptions were correlated with these
behaviors. Focus group and survey results were used to develop
video and leaﬂet communication interventions, which were then
evaluated in a second round of focus groups. This three stage
mixed-methods approach allowed the authors to develop and test
communication materials informed by a quantitatively veriﬁed,
in-depth qualitative understanding of public beliefs and beha-
vioral intentions. To extend the generalizability of the ﬁndings,
this research was conducted in Britain and Germany, two nations
which are culturally similar but have different experiences of and
attitudes towards radiological incidents.33,34
Methods
Scenario
To help participants visualize the discovery of an RED, they were
presented with four media injects. The ﬁrst was a mock
newspaper story describing the discovery of radiological material
during a raid on a terrorist group. This was designed to ‘‘set the
scene’’ for participants by describing a story which appeared in the
week before the start of the incident described in later injects.
The other injects consisted of mock television news footage.
The second inject concerned the recent discovery of a suspicious
package on a commuter train. Eyewitnesses emphasized that
emergency services had not found explosives, that radiation
experts were present and that the train station had been
evacuated. The third inject, which was presented as a news item
from later the same day, focused on ofﬁcial conﬁrmation that the
package was an RED that had been present on the train for
several days. A medical expert described the signs and symptoms
of acute radiation sickness and asked anyone experiencing
symptoms or who was on the train over the past few days to
contact a telephone helpline or visit a monitoring center to check
for exposure. The fourth inject was presented as appearing
three weeks later. It described the re-opening of the train station
and focused on the claims of one ‘‘independent scientist’’ that the
Government had underestimated how many people had been
exposed.
The scenario was adapted for use in the surveys, asking
participants to imagine that ‘‘you hear on the news that a local
train station has been evacuated’’ because of a radioactive package
that ‘‘is not a bomb y but can still emit harmful radiation.’’
Participants were told that ‘‘in the days after this, several people
from your area are brought to hospital and found to have
radiation sickness.’’ After describing their symptoms, participants
were told that the Government had advised people with
symptoms or who might have been on the train in the last week
to call a helpline number.
The second round of focus groups used the same scenario and
injects as the ﬁrst round, but included additional ﬁlmed material
in the third media inject and a short leaﬂet (word count:1011) to
address information needs identiﬁed in ﬁrst round focus groups
and the survey. The new information in the third inject was
presented using an animation to represent the removal of the
device from the train, by extending the information given by the
‘‘medical expert’’ and by introducing a new ‘‘government spokes-
person.’’ This emphasized the limited zone of inﬂuence of the
device and the absence of contamination, and explained the signs
and symptoms of exposure in more detail. The government
spokesperson also asked that only those directly involved in the
incident should seek treatment or monitoring.
The leaﬂet was presented as an ofﬁcial government commu-
nication. It contained information about REDs, a brief descrip-
tion of radiation, and statements that contamination would not
occur and that exposed people posed no threat to the health of
others. It also described the factors that reduce the likelihood
of exposure causing a health effect, the symptoms of exposure,
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how these symptoms can be alleviated and a short discussion of
the steps that emergency services might take if a device was found.
The development of an outline for this incident was informed
by scenarios previously developed for the emergency preparedness
activities of the UK Health Protection Agency (HPA), and
were checked and revised by in-house HPA experts and by
representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of the
Environment and the state health authority in Germany. The
texts for the injects were also checked by these experts and
communications professionals to ensure the accuracy and realism
of the scenarios.
Participants
For the ﬁrst round of focus groups, seven British (n5 52) and
ﬁve German (n5 35) focus groups were conducted. In Britain,
participants were recruited from existing databases of potential
volunteers. A purposive sampling method was used to maximize
variation on the basis of sex, age, marital status, income, religion,
ethnicity, education and to ensure that groups included some
parents and some people who traveled through a mainline
London train station. The sampling procedure was designed to
maximize the range of attitudes accessed with a view to achieving
meaning saturation.35 The British research required more focus
groups than the German research to ensure adequate demo-
graphic variation. In Germany, people were randomly selected
from the Stuttgart City Records Department and sent a letter
inviting them to participate. Respondents completed a socio-
demographic questionnaire before they were assigned to groups
to ensure that the German sample also maximized variation in
relation to sex, age, marital status, religion and to ensure that
groups included some parents and some people who regularly use
Stuttgart Central station (the station used in the German version
of the scenario). Participants were not selected on the basis of
ethnicity in Germany, as Stuttgart has very low levels of ethnic
diversity. Full demographic details are given in Appendix 1 of the
online supplementary material.
The market research company TNS-EMNID conducted
national telephone surveys in Germany and Britain on the
authors’ behalf. They used random digit dialing to contact an
area-based, probability sample of households which had a ﬁxed
line telephone number. Once an interviewer contacted a house-
hold, they asked to speak to the person aged 18 or over who had
had the most recent birthday. After obtaining verbal consent,
they read the ﬁrst section of the scenario, followed by the
outcome variables and predictor variables. Interviewing continued
until at least 1000 participants from each country were obtained.
This provided a sample error of approximately plus or minus
three percent for the prevalence rates. Response rates were
20%-25%. These rates are not unusually low for ‘‘cold calling’’
telephone surveys of this nature.36 For the ﬁnal round of focus
groups, ten new focus groups in Britain (n5 70) and ten in
Germany (n5 63) were conducted using the same method of
recruitment and inclusion criteria as ﬁrst round focus groups.
Demographic details are provided in Appendix 2 of the online
supplementary material.
Focus Groups
Participants were invited to join a discussion of ‘‘public responses
to terrorist events.’’ At each stage of our scenario, participants
were ﬁrst asked to write their thoughts and feelings about the
media inject, prior to discussing their reactions and concerns,
expectations about how the authorities would respond, behavioral
intentions, information needs and preferred information sources
with the rest of the group. Transcripts were analyzed using
thematic analysis.37-39 Separate analysts worked on the German
and British results in their native language. Unless otherwise
stated, no substantive differences were noted between the
countries. King’s College London’s Research Ethics Committee
approved all British data collection in this paper. German data
collection did not require ethical approval. For the second round
focus groups, the procedure and analysis was identical to that in
the ﬁrst round. However, participants were also asked to evaluate
the leaﬂet in terms of its content, presentation and method of
delivery. First round focus groups lasted two hours. The second
round focus groups lasted three hours.
Surveys
Survey questions were based on behaviors identiﬁed in the focus
groups and behaviors that have been reported in the wider
literature following major public health crises. The authors also
assessed perceptions identiﬁed in the focus groups and other
concepts previously shown to be relevant in people’s under-
standings of illness.40
Behavioral Outcomes
Interviewers asked participants how likely they would be to
perform each of 10 actions if the scenario occurred (Table 1).
Response options were ‘‘very likely (coded as 1),’’ ‘‘fairly likely
(2),’’ ‘‘not very likely (3)’’ or ‘‘not at all likely (4).’’ Principal
components analysis and varimax rotation suggested two factors
for these outcomes, accounting for 45.1% of the variance. The
ﬁrst (‘‘avoidance’’) had loadings of greater than 0.6 for variables
relating to leaving home, avoiding work, avoiding going outside,
avoiding crowded areas and wearing a face mask. The second
(‘‘cleaning’’) had loadings of greater than 0.6 for variables relating
to hand washing and cleaning surfaces. Three behaviors did not
load onto the factors: seek medical advice, look for more
information and not change your daily routine or lifestyle.
Predictor and Demographic Variables
Interviewers read participants nineteen statements concerning
perceptions of the incident. Seventeen were adapted from the
revised illness perceptions questionnaire (IPQ-R).42 Two new
statements were also used to assess the perceived importance of
knowing where is and is not safe from radiation (see Appendix 3
in the online supplementary material for wording). Respondents
were asked whether they strongly agreed (coded as a score of 5),
agreed (4), neither agreed nor disagreed (3), disagreed (2) or
strongly disagreed (1) with each statement. Principal components
analysis suggested that data from these items could be reduced to
six factors accounting for 61.8% of the variance. These reﬂected
perceptions that nothing could be done to prevent someone being
exposed to the radiation or becoming ill (labeled ‘‘inevitable’’),
that the participant had the power to affect whether or not they
became ill or that speciﬁc measures or treatments could prevent
exposure or cure exposed people (‘‘controllable’’), that treatments
were not available for those exposed to radiation (‘‘untreatable’’),
that radiation was difﬁcult to understand (‘‘incomprehensible’’),
that exposure would result in severe effects (‘‘severe’’) and that
exposure could be encountered anywhere (‘‘pervasive’’).
Nine items were used to assess the perceived mechanisms
through which an RED might affect health (see Appendix 3).
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Principal components analysis revealed two factors in these data
accounting for 60.8% of the variance. The ﬁrst (‘‘exposure from
others’’), was loaded on by items relating to being near to, sharing
a drink with, touching, or being coughed or sneezed on by someone
who had been affected by the radiation. The second (‘‘exposure from
the environment’’) was loaded on by ﬁve items relating to breathing
in air, eating food, drinking water, being near to objects or touching
objects that had been exposed to radiation.
Each participant’s age, sex, working status, household income,
highest educational qualiﬁcation, ethnicity and whether they took
part in Britain or Germany were recorded.
Analyses
Scores for the various factors were calculated by taking the mean
score for their items, with items reversed where required.
Responses of ‘‘don’t know’’ or ‘‘not applicable’’ were coded as
missing data. Because the distributions for the behavioral
outcome factors were skewed, they were dichotomized using a
median split. Scores for the three behavioral items that did not
load on either factor were dichotomized based on whether
participants were very or fairly likely to perform the action or were
not very or not at all likely to perform it.
Odds ratios were calculated using binary logistic regressions to
test the associations between predictor and outcome variables, using
data from both countries combined. For the association with
perceptions, these regressions adjusted for all demographic variables.
Results
First Round Focus Groups
Perceptions about Radiation Threats—When asked about their
understanding of radiation, the Chernobyl accident and
Hiroshima atomic bomb were widely mentioned by participants.
In discussing how terrorists might use radiological material,
participants commonly referred to large incidents resulting in
radioactive fallout, such as a dirty bomb or nuclear explosion.
Participants had no knowledge about REDs. These were not
mentioned in any group until introduced by our injects. Even
after this, some participants reported that this use seemed
unlikely or did not ﬁt with their preconceptions as to what a
radiological attack would ‘‘look like.’’
Confusion existed about the risks of the incident to people not
directly exposed to the device. Preconceptions based on previous
well-known radiation incidents led some to believe that exposed
members of the public might transfer contamination to others or
that the incident would result in persistent contamination of the
affected area. Even though the medical expert in our third inject
stated that neither effect would occur, some participants continued
to express these views. As one noted, ‘‘I’d think about [y] if I
(or family or friends) may have had contact with a contaminated
person. Also think about the extent of damage of this incident
(ie, contamination spread)’’ (UKG6a, P7, written response).
Several aspects of the scenario failed to meet participant
expectations about radiological terrorism, including the small area
of the police cordon, the absence of an explosion and the lack of
quarantine. Some participants interpreted this as indicating that
this was a failed attack, a scare story or a minor incident: ‘‘Not too
concerned as nothing seems to have exploded or been released
into air’’ (UKG3a, P7, written response). ‘‘If it was radioactive
[affected people would] be put in the big tents’’ (UKG3a, P4).
As a result of their limited concern, most participants reported
that they would be unlikely to alter their behavior beyond
avoiding public transport if it had been disrupted. Some also felt
that altering their behavior would fulﬁl the terrorists’ objectives.
If this situation were to occur, how likely, if at all,
would you be to do each of the following actions?
Very
likely Fairly likely
Not very
likely
Not at all
likely
Not applicable, don’t
know or no answer
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Leave your home and go to live elsewhere until the
risk is over
295 (14.7%) 283 (14.1%) 740 (36.9%) 624 (31.1%) 63 (3.1%)
Avoid going outside your home if at all possible 587 (29.3%) 434 (21.6%) 593 (29.6%) 363 (18.1%) 28 (1.4%)
Avoid going to work or college if applicable 395 (19.7%) 262 (13.1%) 574 (28.6%) 468 (23.3%) 306 (15.3%)
Avoid crowded areas such as public transport,
supermarkets or pubs
777 (38.8%) 467 (23.3%) 481 (24.0%) 254 (12.7%) 26 (1.3%)
Make sure you washed your hands regularly with
soap and water
1436 (71.6%) 302 (15.1%) 135 (6.7%) 105 (5.2%) 27 (1.3%)
Clean hard surfaces such as kitchen worktops and
door handles frequently
837 (41.7%) 389 (19.4%) 457 (22.8%) 280 (14.0%) 42 (2.1%)
Wear a surgical/hygienic facemask when going outside 440 (21.9%) 314 (15.7%) 658 (32.8%) 543 (27.1%) 50 (2.5%)
Seek medical advice from your doctor or general
practitioner
1023 (51.0%) 405 (20.2%) 341 (17.0%) 206 (10.3%) 30 (1.5%)
Look for more information 1548 (77.2%) 333 (16.6%) 65 (3.2%) 53 (2.6%) 6 (0.3%)
Not change your daily routine or lifestyle 506 (25.2%) 429 (21.4%) 548 (27.3%) 465 (23.2%) 57 (2.8%)
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Table 1. Likely Behavioral Reactions During an Incident in which a Radiological Exposure Device has been Discovered in the
Local Area. British and German data are combined for this table.
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For those who accepted that it was a genuine attack, lack of
personal impact and the perception that the incident was self-
contained contributed to their lack of concern. Despite this,
uncertainty was expressed by some as to whether they might have
been exposed to the device prior to its discovery. This was
particularly true if it had lain undiscovered for some time.
Consequently, when asked if they would visit a monitoring
center, some participants indicated that they would go even if
they were not directly involved in the incident: ‘‘I’d probably call
in or go to the center because it didn’t really specify how close you
had to be or within what proximity’’ (UKG1a, P5). Others noted
a lack of clarity as to what behavioral changes they should make:
‘‘Daunted but left in the dark as to what threat is or what I can
possibly do to avoid it’’ (UKG4a, P8, written response).
In addition, some participants raised concern about the
likelihood of further devices being found and expressed a desire
for more information relating to security issues: ‘‘I would have
liked to know [y] what’s happening, are there any names of the
terrorist group and stuff like that’’ (DEG5a, P2).
Communicating Health-Related Information—Many participants
expressed a desire for more factual information about the
scenario. Questions often revolved around the likelihood of
being affected: ‘‘I would want more information to make sure that
I was safey that you’re safe if you’re outside that [cordoned]
area’’ (UKG2a, P7).
Participants also wanted information about symptoms and
reassurance that people could be treated successfully: ‘‘I would
want someone to say [y] it’s alright we can give you something’’
(UKG1a, P7). For others, the lack of behavioral advice in the
injects led them to seek information about what they should do:
‘‘Well, I would like to have information about what I personally
could do, in concrete terms’’ (DEG1a, P1).
Participants in both countries expected that the government
would provide a statement, although there was an expectation
that some information would be withheld for security reasons. In
Germany, this was coupled with a belief that the government
would downplay the incident and withhold information in order to
prevent public disquiet: ‘‘I would expect that if there is something
about radiation that a lot of stuff will be not talked abouty It was
the same with Chernobyl. First it wasn’t a threat [y] later it came
out it was severe. I would distrust right away’’ (DEG4a, P2).
Information presented by the media was also viewed with
suspicion, based on previous experience of ‘‘media scare stories’’:
‘‘just one of those media [y] things where everything’s blown
out of proportion’’ (UKG1a, P5), but participants expressed a
generally positive attitude to receiving information from non-
governmental sources. Our ‘‘independent scientist’’ was viewed by
some as expressing concerns that aligned with their existing
perceptions regarding the long-term health impacts of radiation.
However for some he lost credibility for being ‘‘chosen by the
media for what he had to say’’ (UKG4a, P1).
Surveys
Table 1 shows the responses for each behavior. The most likely
reaction was ‘‘look for more information,’’ which 77.2% of
participants said they were very likely to do. Other reactions rated as
very likely by more than half of the participants were ‘‘wash your
hands regularly with soap and water’’ and ‘‘seek medical advice.’’
The associations between the outcome and demographic
variables are shown in Table 2. In general, participants who were
female, older, from Britain, retired, from an ethnic minority
group, poorer or had lower educational qualiﬁcations were more
likely to engage in the behaviors.
Table 3 shows the association between perceptions and the
behavioral outcomes. In line with the focus group results,
perceptions about how pervasive the risks from radiation would
be, the possibility of being affected by other people and the
possibility of being affected by environmental contamination
were strongly associated with each of the intended behaviors that
were assessed, apart from ‘‘doing nothing.’’ The perceived severity
of the effects of exposure also showed a strong association with
behavioral intentions. While other perceptions showed some
signiﬁcant associations with behavioral intentions (see Table 3),
these were weaker and therefore of less relevance from a
communications perspective.
Second Round Focus Groups
Response to the New Material—Participants responded positively
to the additional ﬁlmed information. They felt reassured that
the size of the cordoned area was appropriate and reported that
they understood the lack of quarantine. Several also reported
that this information had countered their misperceptions regarding
the spread of contamination: ‘‘I was under the impression that, say
if I was radioactive, if I met you, you became radioactive and it
would pass, so when he said it doesn’t pass on like that, that was
actually quite reassuring’’ (UKG6b, P1).
Despite this, some remained unwilling to accept that an
affected area would not be contaminated once a device was
removed, that individuals who had been exposed would not be
‘‘contagious’’ and that any effects would be limited to the
immediate area surrounding the device: ‘‘I’m not sure if I’m
convinced by line that people exposed to radiation aren’t in some
way ‘contagious’ ’’ (UKG8b, P3, written response). This trend
was stronger in Germany, where participants also continued to
talk about contamination and the need to close doors and
windows in their homes: ‘‘[It’s] not true, the whole train is
contaminated, the whole environment. You can’t just go into the
station and say hey, the source is gone, it’s all ﬁne. The whole
station is contaminated’’ (DEG1b, P7).
As with the ﬁrst round of focus groups, there were high levels
of intended compliance in relation to avoiding the cordoned area
and visiting a monitoring center if required. However, partici-
pants in the second round appeared less inclined to visit the
monitoring center if they were not directly involved in the
incident. Participants attributed this to feeling conﬁdent they
would not have been affected if they were not on the train.
Initial reactions to the leaﬂet intervention were similarly
positive, with the majority of participants describing the leaﬂet as
informative, clear and easy to understand: ‘‘I think it’s good that
it’s written in a way that people can understand it without prior
knowledge on those things’’ (DEG6b, P3). The permanent,
concrete nature of a written communication was also viewed
positively, partly because people could refer to it later if needed
and partly because it would be harder for the Government to
revoke or change written advice a later stage: ‘‘It’s one thing them
making a statement. But then giving somethingy that then
strengthens your belief in the whole system’’ (UKG5b, P1).
The leaﬂet also had an impact on participants’ responses to the
‘‘independent scientist.’’ Where his comments resonated with
existing concerns, participants remained worried: ‘‘I think he
conﬁrms what I thought in the beginning that the problem is
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Variable Variable levels n (%) or
mean (sd)a
Odds ratio
(95% CI) for
being likely to
‘‘avoid’’b
Odds ratio
(95% CI) for
being likely to
‘‘clean’’c
Odds ratio
(95% CI) for
being likely to
seek medical
advice
Odds ratio
(95% CI) for
being likely to
look for more
information
Odds ratio
(95% CI) for
being likely to do
nothing for now
Sex Female 1116 (55.7%) 1.5 (1.3-1.8) 1.4 (1.2-1.7) 1.5 (1.2-1.8) 1.2 (0.8-1.8) 1.0 (0.8-1.2)
Male 889 (44.3%) Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Age Not applicable 50.1yr (15.6) 1.02 (1.01-1.02) 1.02 (1.02-1.03) 1.0 (0.99-1.007) 1.0 (0.99-1.02) 1.01 (1.006-1.02)
Country Britain 1000 (49.9%) 1.2 (1.002-1.4) 1.9 (1.6-2.3) 0.8 (0.6-0.95) 1.5 (1.06-2.3) 1.5 (1.2-1.8)
Germany 1005 (50.1%) Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Working status Retired 478 (23.9%) 1.9 (1.6-2.4) 1.9 (1.5-2.3) 1.2 (0.98-1.6) 0.9 (0.6-1.4) 1.4 (1.2-1.8)
Not working 296 (14.8%) 1.2 (0.96-1.6) 1.2 (0.96-1.6) 1.4 (1.05-1.9) 0.9 (0.5-1.4) 0.9 (0.7-1.2)
Working 8hrs or more a
week
1226 (61.3%) Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Ethnicity Ethnic minority 92 (4.6%) 1.8 (1.1-2.7) 1.3 (0.9-2.0) 2.0 (1.1-3.5) 0.6 (0.3-1.1) 0.9 (0.6-1.4)
White or German 1896 (95.4%) Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Household income Under £30,000 per annum
or 2,000 euro per month
842 (50.9%) 1.9 (1.6-2.3) 1.9 (1.5-2.3) 1.2 (0.98-1.5) 0.7 (0.5-1.1) 1.1 (0.9-1.3)
Over £30,000 per annum
or 2,000 euro per month
813 (49.1%) Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Highest educational
qualification
GCSE level or lower 652 (34.2%) 2.5 (2.0-3.2) 2.5 (2.0-3.2) 2.3 (1.8-3.0) 0.6 (0.3-0.9) 1.1 (0.9-1.4)
A-level 656 (34.4%) 1.3 (1.02-1.6) 1.3 (1.03-1.7) 1.7 (1.4-2.2) 0.8 (0.4-1.3) 0.9 (0.7-1.1)
University-level or higher 598 (31.4%) Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
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Table 2. Association Between Demographic Variables and Likely Behaviors
aNumbers that do not sum to 2005 are the result of ‘‘not applicable,’’ ‘‘don’t know,’’ or ‘‘prefer not to say’’ responses.
bBased on a median split for ﬁve avoidance-related variables.
cBased on a median split for two cleaning-related variables.
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much bigger than what we thought’’ (UKG5b, P3, written
response). However, there was a greater tendency in second
round focus groups for participants to question the validity of his
claims, using arguments drawn from the ofﬁcial information
provided to them: ‘‘Well, I felt that this guy [independent expert]
was not trustworthy. He said the opposite of what the ofﬁcials
said’’ (DEG3b, P2).
Criticisms of the leaﬂet focused on its length, the density and
complexity of the text, the lack of illustrations and accessibility
issues for groups with disabilities. There was also a belief that the
use of leaﬂets might cause worry: ‘‘I can imagine that people who
aren’t concerned [y] and then receive a leaﬂet like this, that they
become more nervous, that they might think there must be
something bigger behind that otherwise the government wouldn’t
make this effort’’ (DEG6b, P1).
Some concern was raised about the timing of the leaﬂets or its
impact on people who were not motivated to read it. In both
respects, attempting to educate the public about the nature of
radiological terrorism before an incident occurs struck some
participants as unlikely to work: ‘‘If I’d had this a week, two weeks
before the [radiation] issue, [do you] know where I’d put it to ﬁnd
it again? Recycling box probably’’ (UKG2b, P1).
Unresolved Issues—Despite the additional information, participants
still wanted more health-related information about prevention,
protection, symptoms and treatment. Concerns about prevention
and protection related to a desire for more information about how
to identify an RED and which type of radiation it would emit.
In terms of symptoms participants were keen to know if there
were any distinguishing features which would allow them to
conﬁrm that they were suffering from radiation sickness. For
treatment, concerns were expressed about the lack of speciﬁc
details or reassurance that radiation sickness could be cured:
‘‘The bit that says how radiation sickness is treated doesn’t tell
you how radiation sickness is treatedy Are you gonna give me
antibiotics or can’t it be cured?’’ (UKG7b, P8).
Variable (example statement) Mean (sd)a Adjusted
odds ratio
(95% CI) for
being likely
to ‘‘avoid’’b
Adjusted
odds ratio
(95% CI) for
being likely
to ‘‘clean’’c
Adjusted odds
ratio (95% CI)
for being likely
to seek medical
advice
Adjusted odds
ratio (95% CI)
for being likely
to look for more
information
Adjusted odds
ratio (95% CI)
for being likely
to do nothing
for now
Inevitable (Nothing I do will
affect whether or not I
become ill)
3.0 (1.0) 1.0 (0.9-1.1) 1.0 (0.9-1.2) 1.0 (0.9-1.2) 0.9 (0.7-1.1) 1.1 (1.00-1.2)
Controllable (There is a lot I
could do to control whether I
am affected)
3.0 (0.9) 1.3 (1.1-1.4) 1.2 (1.04-1.3) 1.4 (1.2-1.6) 1.2 (0.97-1.6) 1.0 (0.9-1.1)
Untreatable (There is nothing
that can be done to help
people who have been
exposed to the radiation)
2.7 (0.8) 1.2 (1.03-1.3) 1.0 (0.8-1.1) 0.9 (0.7-1.004) 0.9 (0.7-1.2) 0.9 (0.8-1.0)
Incomprehensible (Radiation
is a mystery to me)
2.8 (1.1) 1.2 (1.1-1.3) 1.1 (0.99-1.2) 1.3 (1.1-1.4) 1.1 (0.9-1.4) 0.9 (0.8-1.0)
Severity (Exposure would
have major consequences
on my life)
4.4 (0.7) 1.5 (1.3-1.8) 1.2 (1.02-1.4) 1.1 (0.9-1.3) 1.8 (1.3-2.3) 0.8 (0.7-0.9)
Pervasive (You could be
affected by radiation almost
anywhere)
3.4 (1.1) 1.6 (1.4-1.8) 1.4 (1.2-1.5) 1.4 (1.3-1.6) 1.4 (1.2-1.7) 0.9 (0.8-1.02)
Exposure from others
(someone’s health could be
affected by touching
someone who has been
affected by the radiation)
3.2 (1.1) 1.9 (1.7-2.1) 1.6 (1.4-1.8) 1.6 (1.4-1.8) 1.5 (1.2-1.8) 1.0 (0.8-0.99)
Exposure from the
environment (someone’s
health could be affected by
drinking water that has been
exposed to the radiation)
4.0 (0.8) 2.1 (1.8-2.4) 1.5 (1.3-1.8) 1.5 (1.3-1.7) 1.7 (1.4-2.2) 0.9 (0.8-0.98)
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Table 3. Association Between Perceptions and Likely Behaviors. All odds ratios were adjusted for age, sex, country, working
status, ethnicity, household income and highest educational qualiﬁcation.
aScores range from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).
bBased on a median split for ﬁve avoidance-related variables.
cBased on a median split for two cleaning-related variables.
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In addition to health-related information, participants also
wanted more information that would enable them to assess the
likelihood of further attacks and formulate an appropriate
response: ‘‘I think we want to know if there’s any indication of
who put it there, you know whether it’s potentially a terrorist
thing or whether it’s you know some crazy guy who just got ﬁred
from his job’’ (UKG4b, P7).
Discussion
In addition to the potential physical health effects on those who
have been directly exposed, a terrorist attack using an RED has
the potential to cause fear and behavior change among the wider
population. The results from the ﬁrst round of focus groups and
surveys suggest that such effects would be largely due to concerns
and misperceptions among the public about their likelihood of
being exposed to radiation. In part, these concerns relate to the
inevitable uncertainties that would surround the discovery of any
hidden exposure device: how long has it been there, where else
has it been, how far away from it is ‘‘safe’’ and are other devices
still out there? Misperceptions about the nature of an exposure
device are also important, however, including the belief held that
persistent contamination would occur and would spread through
the environment and from person to person.
In both the focus groups and surveys, perceptions about the
likelihood of being exposed and the routes through which
exposure might occur were associated with higher levels of worry
and greater likelihood of engaging in behaviors that might be
detrimental to ongoing public health efforts, such as unnecessary
attendance at a monitoring or health care facility. This ﬁnding
ties in well with existing theoretical models of why people engage
in protective behavior during an emergency,41,42 with existing
research on radiation risk communication5 and with evidence
from previous real-life incidents.33,43
The misperceptions about the likely presence of contamina-
tion arising were largely driven by our participants’ lack of
familiarity with exposure devices and their reliance on analogies
with better-known radiation threats such as Chernobyl or the
atomic bomb. These analogies had a second, undesirable effect,
with some participants deciding that because an RED, or the
authorities’ response to it, did not meet their expectations, the
incident was therefore a scare story or failed attack. This false
reassurance could itself have undesirable effects if it results in
exposed members of public failing to heed public health advice
due to a lack of concern.
The second round of focus groups demonstrated that both
types of misunderstanding are amenable to change following
targeted communication. The ‘‘pre-prepared’’ leaﬂet and the
additional information provided by spokespeople were able to
alter people’s understanding of the nature of an exposure device,
leading to more realistic risk perceptions and differing intentions
with respect to attending a monitoring facility. This supports
post-incident analysis of real life events which has highlighted
lack of effective risk communication as an important contributory
factor to high demand for medical attention from low-risk patients.8
Yet while providing such information was effective in the
relative comfort of a focus group, providing it during the chaos of
a real incident will inevitably pose more challenges. In particular,
the lack of trust the participants reported with respect to the
media, the government, and independent scientists may make it
difﬁcult to convey credible information during a crisis. This is a
well-recognized problem.10,41,44 Interestingly, our written leaﬂet
was viewed by participants as one particularly credible source of
information, due to both its permanence and the implication that
the messages must be important if time and money had been
spent communicating them. This suggests that although interest
in alternative forms of communication is growing,45 a role
remains for more traditional forms of communication.
Limitations
Several methodological limitations should be borne in mind
when considering the results of this study. With respect to our
focus groups, as with all qualitative research, the use of a small,
non-probability sample limits the generalizablity of ﬁndings and
increases the possibility of biased responses. However, the
advantage of obtaining data based on discussion among group
members rather than asking participants to respond solely to our
direct questions may outweigh this concern. Conformity and
group polarization effects are also of potential concern.46,47 These
issues were mitigated by using experienced moderators and by
asking participants to provide written responses prior to discussion.
The use of a hypothetical scenario raises the possibility that
the behavioral intentions expressed by focus group participants
may not reﬂect behaviors that would be performed in the event of
a real incident. However, the scenario beneﬁted by being
informed by scenarios previously developed for the emergency
preparedness activities of the UK Health Protection Agency
(HPA) and by being checked for accuracy and realism by
radiation experts in the UK and Germany. Realism was further
enhanced through the use of professional-quality media injects to
communicate the scenario to participants. Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize that high experimental realism may bias
some responses. For example, we cannot be sure that the wider
public would pay the same level of attention to information
provided in leaﬂets.
With respect to our survey, our reliance on a hypothetical
scenario raises the possibility that the data we obtained reﬂected
‘‘non-opinions,’’ answers which did not reﬂect the genuine beliefs
held by participants but which were provided simply to satisfy the
needs of the survey.48 While this is possible, the fact that the
pattern of associations identiﬁed between perceptions and
behavioral intentions was similar to that found in other, genuine
incidents33 and in the focus groups provides some reassurance that
this was not the case. Whether the results accurately reﬂect the
perceptions and intentions held by the general publics of Britain and
Germany is more debatable. The low response rates achieved by
telephone surveys of the type used here inevitably raise doubts as to
the psychological representativeness of their samples. However, in
this context, it is noteworthy that recent research has shown that
telephone surveys which use market research techniques can be more
accurate in estimating health-related parameters than conventional
epidemiological techniques.49
Conclusions
These ﬁndings demonstrate the role of targeted communication
in mitigating the psychological impact of radiological terrorism.
Consistent with previous studies, participants exhibited low levels
of knowledge about radiation and were confused about the risk of
exposure, transmission and contamination. The potential for
uncertainty and confusion to increase the burden on medical
services was also supported, as was the role of trust in those tasked
with providing advice. However, the use of a non-explosive
scenario highlighted the potential for unfamiliarity to reduce as
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well as enhance concern. This suggests that generic radiation
communication which aims to reduce anxiety may not be
appropriate in situations where the mode of dispersal is
inconsistent with existing preconceptions about radiological
terrorism. These ﬁndings therefore indicate the need for targeted
communication which addresses existing public preconceptions
about the ways in which radiological material can be deployed.
Should terrorists succeed in placing a hidden radiological
device in a public location, then health agencies may ﬁnd that
it is easier to communicate effectively with the public if they
explicitly and clearly discuss the mechanisms through which
someone could be affected by the radiation and the known
geographical spread of any risk. Messages which explain how
the risk from a hidden radiological device ‘‘works’’ should be
prepared and tested in advance so that they can be rapidly
deployed if the need arises.
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